When an insurance note is also a derivative a serious problem arises because a derivative must be fulfilled immediately. This feature of derivatives prevents claims processing procedures that screen out ineligible claims. This, in turn, creates a perverse incentive for insured holders of notes to commit acts that result in payment. This problem first surfaced with CDS contracts, which are part of a class of loan insurance I term a default insurance note.
Introduction
There is a long-standing problem in the insurance industry with bad-faith clients. For instance, a suicide will not result in payout of the claim. An arsonist will not be paid for damage to property. And a diamond merchant will not be paid for diamonds he fenced on the black market. This is dealt with in classical insurance with riders denying claims where the client causes their own insured harm intentionally. The denial of claims requires a claim processing department and investigators that examine each claim and decide whether a claim will be paid or not, which can take some time.
There is, however, a serious problem that arises when the insurance instrument is also a derivative. In that case, the law requires immediate execution, without recourse to the courts. The USA's 1982 safe-harbor bankruptcy code provisions were the first to grant derivative holders the right to immediate foreclosure on underlying assets (Gilbane 2010) . The history of such safe-harbor provisions for forward, commodity, and security contracts, repurchase and swap agreements is founded on necessity.
Consider, for instance, what would happen if the holder of an orange juice future contract could be held off by court filing. Let us say that the price of orange juice rose which gives the futures call option a profit. The owner of the orange juice refuses to honor the call option, sells the orange juice to a food company and pockets the difference. This forces the holder of the call option to go to file in court, at his expense, and wait for the case to be decided. A smart litigator can draw things out for a long time. This would end meaningful trade in futures contracts, thereby destroying the market for them.
Public law 109-8, also known as BACPA, passed in 2005 (Grassley 2005) , ensures new derivative instruments are treated in the same way.
I believe that this derivative-classed insurance instrument jackpot problem was first seen in the run-up to the 2008 banking crisis. In that crisis, AIG was the underwriter, and various major banks in the USA were the clients purchasing credit default swap (CDS) contracts for home loans.
Citigroup, for instance, was accused of lying to investors who bought securities composed of loans.
Citigroup had bought CDS's against the loans (Rakoff 2011; Wyatt 2011) , and retained the CDS's after selling off the loans. When the loans went into default, Citigroup collected on the CDS contracts.
I have termed such insurance on loans that are derivatives, a default insurance note (DIN) (Hanley, 2012) .
It doesn't take much thought to see that it is quite profitable to make a poor quality loan, buy a DIN on that loan, sell off the loan, then collect on the DIN. Doing so returns capital, then doubles capital when the loan defaults. If half the loans in a bundled security default within 12 months, then the overall return is 1.5, or 50% for that year. AIG got caught by that perverse incentive.
Venture-banking overview
Venture-banking is a new concept I have defined that uses underwriting of a default insurance note (DIN) to insure investments processed as bank loans (Hanley, 2017) . The use of the DIN allows the bank to book the insured value of the DIN back into Tier 1 or Tier 2 reserves. I show that an underwriter can operate quite profitably on broad venture capital portfolios within a range of conventional returns that are achieved by real world portfolios. I also show that venture banking dramatically increases rates of return. The primary data source I used came from Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation's 20 years of venture capital experience in banking, as shown in figure 1 (Mulcahy, 2012) .
The DIN instrument for insuring venture-capital that is administered as bank loans enables use of the DIN to take advantage of the multiplier I discovered analyzing the 2008 banking crisis (Hanley, 2012) . Unlike the classical banking multiplier The core of the venture-banking design is that the venture bank pays some premium per the dollar of insured loan per year (5% in my modeling), and at closeout, the underwriter receives a large share of the investment equity value, either as stock or cash (50% in my modeling). I do not allow for bankers to purchase multiples of the loan value, nor multiple DINs using the same loan. This latter would be considered fraud.
In the venture-bank system an individual venture capital fund would put their money into a venture bank utility (VBU), which would take care of bank operations for the fund as shown. Similarly, the returns for venture-banks can rise above the 29X maximum that an insured would receive from taking all their investments to zero.
For the bank as a whole, and underwriting as a whole, it is unlikely that returns above 1.50 would be seen. However, there are venture capital firms that have outstanding returns as reported by Kauffman data. Venture capitalists are gamblers to a significant extent, so it could be that using this algorithm would end up shaking out the bottom ⅓ to ½ of venture funds. Such funds would no longer receive underwriting, thus removing them from future bank returns. This could result over time in higher returns for everyone, but that would probably occur at the expense of significantly shrinking the pool of available capital for entrepreneurs, which is an undesirable result. I propose a novel instrument instead to cure both problems. The clawback lien would vary depending on:
Clawback lien attached to DIN instruments
-The cost of the DIN per year; the higher the yearly DIN rate, the lower the clawback.
-Funds cost for underwriters. The higher the rate underwriters pay, the higher the clawback.
-The structure of the DIN payments, whether flat, front-loaded or back-loaded, as these result in some variation for the underwriter.
To set the clawback lien rate will require modeling of these features of the DIN rather than a simple mathematical formula. However, I expect that standard sets of contract terms should develop rather rapidly, so the requirement for modeling should not be a significant obstruction.
Below is shown the results from a model using a DIN rate of 5% per year, a DIN equity share of 50% and a clawback lien rate of 62.3%.
As we see in figures 7 and 8, by means of the clawback lien, the perverse incentive is eliminated. The venture capital firm that is using the VBU to make investments, now has a smoothly The goal of the clawback lien rate model is that when a portfolio for a venture capital firm goes to zero, the DIN returns are barely positive, and do not go below zero. In practice, underwriters will experience losses in such situations because the venture capital firms will simply not have enough assets to cover. But underwriter losses should be minimal. In most cases, should the venture capital firm choose bankruptcy court, the DIN liens should be in primary position.
As a rule, I do not expect that venture capital firms would choose bankruptcy court without the consent of the underwriters, because future DIN coverage would depend on a good relationship with the underwriters. For the same reason, I do not expect that venture capital firms involved with the VBU system would abandon their investments very often when they have major losses.
Concluding remarks
The clawback lien instrument should all but eliminate losses for underwriters insuring venture-bank investments when venture capital firms have returns from zero to break-even. This clawback lien should prevent discouraging underwriters from providing DIN coverage to venture capital firms that have experienced significant past losses, except in the worst cases. Venture capital firms composed of new principals should also have minimal difficulty obtaining DIN coverage. The clawback lien thus creates robust support for venture capital firms, and hence for entrepreneurial ventures, while keeping most losses where they belong -with the venture capitalists.
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